





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
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# *A LEAGUE of NATIONS*

Vol. IV, No. 5

October, 1921

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## **Washington Agreement on Capital Ships**

## **Disarmament on the Great Lakes**

## **Unfortified Frontiers**

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World Peace Foundation  
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FOUNDED IN 1910 BY EDWIN GINN



The corporation is constituted for the purpose of educating the people of all nations to a full knowledge of the waste and destructiveness of war, its evil effects on present social conditions and on the well-being of future generations, and to promote international justice and the brotherhood of man; and, generally, by every practical means to promote peace and good will among all mankind.—*By-laws of the Corporation.*

It is to this patient and thorough work of education, through the school, the college, the church, the press, the pamphlet and the book, that the World Peace Foundation addresses itself.—Edwin Ginn.

The idea of force can not at once be eradicated. It is useless to believe that the nations can be persuaded to disband their present armies and dismantle their present navies, trusting in each other or in the Hague Tribunal to settle any possible differences between them, unless, first, some substitute for the existing forces is provided and demonstrated by experience to be adequate to protect the rights, dignity and territory of the respective nations. My own belief is that the idea which underlies the movement for the Hague Court can be developed so that the nations can be persuaded each to contribute a small percentage of their military forces at sea and on land to form an *International Guard or Police Force.*—Edwin Ginn.

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## I. WASHINGTON NAVAL AGREEMENT ON CAPITAL SHIPS

### 1. ADDRESS OF SECRETARY OF STATE HUGHES

**GENTLEMEN:** It is with a deep sense of privilege and responsibility that I accept the honor [permanent chairmanship] you have conferred.

Permit me to express the most cordial appreciation of the assurances of friendly co-operation, which have been generously expressed by the representatives of all the invited Governments. The earnest desire and purpose, manifested in every step in the approach to this meeting, that we should meet the reasonable expectation of a watching world by effective action suited to the opportunity is the best augury for the success of the Conference.

The President invited the Governments of the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan to participate in a conference on the subject of limitation of armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions would also be discussed. It would have been most agreeable to the President to have invited all the Powers to take part in this Conference, but it was thought to be a time when other considerations should yield to the practical requirements of the existing exigency, and in this view the invitation was extended to the group known as the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, which, by reason of the conditions produced by the war, control in the main the armament of the world. The opportunity to limit armament lies within their grasp.

It was recognized, however, that the interests of other Powers in the Far East made it appropriate that they should be invited to participate in the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern problems, and, with the approval of the five Powers, an invitation to take part in the discussion of those questions has been extended to Belgium, China, the Netherlands and Portugal.

The inclusion of the proposal for the discussion of Pacific and Far Eastern questions was not for the purpose of embarrassing or delaying an agreement for limitation of armament, but rather to

support that undertaking by availing ourselves of this meeting to endeavor to reach a common understanding as to the principles and policies to be followed in the Far East and thus greatly diminish, and, if possible, wholly to remove, discernible sources of controversy. It is believed that by interchanges of views at this opportune time the Governments represented here may find a basis of accord and thus give expression to their desire to assure enduring friendship.

In the public discussions which have preceded the Conference there have been apparently two competing views; one, that the consideration of armament should await the result of the discussion of Far Eastern questions, and another, that the latter discussion should be postponed until an agreement for limitation of armament has been reached. I am unable to find sufficient reason for adopting either of these extreme views. I think that it would be most unfortunate if we should disappoint the hopes which have attached to this meeting by a postponement of the consideration of the first subject. The world looks to this Conference to relieve humanity of the crushing burden created by competition in armament, and it is the view of the American Government that we should meet the expectation without any unnecessary delay. It is, therefore, proposed that the Conference should proceed at once to consider the question of the limitation of armament.

This, however, does not mean that we must postpone the examination of Far Eastern questions. These questions of vast importance press for solution. It is hoped that immediate provision may be made to deal with them adequately, and it is suggested that it may be found to be entirely practicable through the distribution of the work among designated committees to make progress to the ends sought to be achieved without either subject being treated as a hindrance to the proper consideration and disposition of the other.

#### PREVIOUS EFFORT REVIEWED

The proposal to limit armament by an agreement of the Powers is not a new one, and we are admonished by the futility of earlier efforts. It may be well to recall the noble aspirations which were voiced twenty-three years ago in the imperial rescript of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia. It was then pointed out

with clarity and emphasis that "the intellectual and physical strength of the nations, labor and capital are for the major part diverted from their natural application and unproductively consumed. Hundreds of millions are devoted to acquiring terrible engines of destruction, which, though to-day regarded as the last word of science, are destined to-morrow to lose all value in consequence of some fresh discovery in the same field. National culture, economic progress and the production of wealth are either paralyzed or checked in their development. Moreover, in proportion as the armaments of each power increase, so do they less and less fulfill the object which the Governments have set before themselves. The economic crises, due in great part to the system of armaments *à l'outrance* and the continual danger which lies in this massing of war materials, are transforming the armed peace of our days into a crushing burden, which the peoples have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evident, then, that if this state of things were prolonged it would inevitably lead to the calamity which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which make every thinking man shudder in advance. To put an end to these incessant armaments and to seek the means of warding off the calamities which are threatening the whole world—such is the supreme duty which is to-day imposed on all states."

It was with this sense of obligation that His Majesty the Emperor of Russia proposed the conference, which was "to occupy itself with this grave problem" and which met at The Hague in the year 1899. Important as were the deliberations and conclusions of that conference, especially with respect to the pacific settlement of international disputes, its result in the specific matter of limitation of armament went no further than the adoption of a final resolution setting forth the opinion "that the restriction of military charges, which are at present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desirable for the increase of the material and moral welfare of mankind," and the utterance of the wish that the Governments "may examine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea, and of war budgets."

It was seven years later that the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Elihu Root, in answering a note of the Russian Ambassador, suggesting in outline a program of the Second Peace Conference, said: "The Government of the United States, there-

fore, feels it to be its duty to reserve for itself the liberty to propose to the Second Peace Conference, as one of the subjects for consideration, the reduction or limitation of armaments, in the hope that, if nothing further can be accomplished, some slight advance may be made toward the realization of the lofty conception which actuated the Emperor of Russia in calling the First Conference." It is significant that the Imperial German Government expressed itself as "absolutely opposed to the question of disarmament," and that the Emperor of Germany threatened to decline to send delegates if the subject of disarmament was to be discussed. In view, however, of the resolution which had been adopted at the First Hague Conference, the delegates of the United States were instructed that the subject of limitation of armament "should be regarded as unfinished business, and that the Second Conference should ascertain and give full consideration to the results of such examination as the Governments may have given to the possibility of an agreement pursuant to the wish expressed by the First Conference." But by reason of the obstacles which the subject had encountered, the Second Peace Conference at The Hague, although it made notable progress in provision for the peaceful settlement of controversies, was unable to deal with limitation of armament except by a resolution in the following general terms: "The Conference confirms the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 in regard to the limitation of military expenditure; and, inasmuch as military expenditure has considerably increased in almost every country since that time, the Conference declares that it is eminently desirable that the Governments should resume the serious examination of this question."

#### EXTRAORDINARY OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED

This was the fruition of the efforts of eight years. Although the effect was clearly perceived, the race in preparation of armament, wholly unaffected by these futile suggestions, went on until it fittingly culminated in the greatest war of history; and we are now suffering from the unparalleled loss of life, the destruction of hopes, the economic dislocations and the widespread impoverishment which measure the cost of the victory over the brutal pretensions of military force.

But if we are warned by the inadequacy of earlier endeavors for

limitation of armament, we can not fail to recognize the extraordinary opportunity now presented. We not only have the lessons of the past to guide us, not only do we have the reaction from the disillusioning experience of war, but we must meet the challenge of imperative economic demands. What was convenient or highly desirable before is now a matter of vital necessity. If there is to be economic rehabilitation, if the longings for reasonable progress are not to be denied, if we are to be spared the uprisings of peoples made desperate in the desire to shake off burdens no longer durable, competition in armament must stop. The present opportunity not only derives its advantage from a general appreciation of this fact, but the power to deal with the exigency now rests with a small group of nations, represented here, who have every reason to desire peace and to promote amity. The astounding ambition which lay athwart the promise of the Second Hague Conference no longer menaces the world, and the great opportunity of liberty-loving and peace-preserving democracies has come. Is it not plain that the time has passed for mere resolutions that the responsible Powers should examine the question of limitation of armament? We can no longer content ourselves with investigations, with statistics, with reports, with the circumlocution of inquiry. The essential facts are sufficiently known. The time has come, and this Conference has been called, not for general resolutions or mutual advice, but for action. We meet with full understanding that the aspirations of mankind are not to be defeated either by plausible suggestions of postponement or by impracticable counsels of perfection. Power and responsibility are here and the world awaits a practicable program which shall at once be put into execution.

I am confident that I shall have your approval in suggesting that in this matter, as well as in others before the Conference, it is desirable to follow the course of procedure which has the best promise of achievement rather than one which would facilitate division; and thus, constantly aiming to agree so far as possible, we shall, with each point of agreement, make it easier to proceed to others.

#### END IT Now Is WAY OUT

The question, in relation to armament, which may be regarded as of primary importance at this time, and with which we can deal

most promptly and effectively, is the limitation of naval armament. There are certain general considerations which may be deemed pertinent to this subject.

The first is that the core of the difficulty is to be found in the competition in naval programs, and that, in order appropriately to limit naval armament, competition in its production must be abandoned. Competition will not be remedied by resolves with respect to the method of its continuance. One program inevitably leads to another, and if competition continues, its regulation is impracticable. There is only one adequate way out and that is to end it now.

It is apparent that this can not be accomplished without serious sacrifices. Enormous sums have been expended upon ships under construction and building programs which are now under way can not be given up without heavy loss. Yet if the present construction of capital ships goes forward other ships will inevitably be built to rival them, and this will lead to still others. Thus the race will continue so long as ability to continue lasts. The effort to escape sacrifices is futile. We must face them or yield our purpose.

It is also clear that no one of the naval Powers should be expected to make these sacrifices alone. The only hope of limitation of naval armament is by agreement among the nations concerned, and this agreement should be entirely fair and reasonable in the extent of the sacrifices required of each of the Powers. In considering the basis of such an agreement, and the commensurate sacrifices to be required, it is necessary to have regard to the existing naval strength of the great naval Powers, including the extent of construction already effected in the case of ships in process. This follows from the fact that one nation is as free to compete as another, and each may find grounds for its action. What one may do another may demand the opportunity to rival, and we remain in the thrall of competitive effort. I may add that the American delegates are advised by their naval experts that the tonnage of capital ships may fairly be taken to measure the relative strength of navies, as the provision for auxiliary combatant craft should sustain a reasonable relation to the capital ship tonnage allowed.

It would also seem to be a vital part of a plan for the limitation of naval armament that there should be a naval holiday. It is

proposed that for a period of not less than 10 years there should be no further construction of capital ships.

I am happy to say that I am at liberty to go beyond these general propositions, and, on behalf of the American Delegation acting under the instructions of the President of the United States, to submit to you a concrete proposition for an agreement for the limitation of naval armament.

It should be added that this proposal immediately concerns the British Empire, Japan and the United States. In view of the extraordinary conditions, due to the World War, affecting the existing strength of the navies of France and Italy, it is not thought to be necessary to discuss at this stage of the proceedings the tonnage allowance of these nations, but the United States proposes that this matter be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference.

#### FOUR PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION

In making the present proposal the United States is most solicitous to deal with the question upon an entirely reasonable and practicable basis to the end that the just interests of all shall be adequately guarded and that national security and defense shall be maintained. Four general principles have been applied:

- (1) That all capital shipbuilding programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned;
- (2) That further reductions should be made through the scrapping of certain of the older ships;
- (3) That in general regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the Powers concerned;
- (4) That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies, and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.

The principal features of the proposed agreement are as follows:

*United States—*

**CAPITAL SHIPS**

The United States is now completing its program of 1916, calling for 10 new battleships and 6 battle cruisers. One battleship has been completed. The others are in various stages of construction: in some cases from 60 to 80 per cent of the construction has been done. On these 15 capital ships now being built, over

\$330,000,000 have been spent. Still, the United States is willing in the interest of immediate limitation of naval armament to scrap all these ships.

The United States proposes, if this plan is accepted—

(1) To scrap all capital ships now under construction. This includes 6 battle cruisers and 7 battleships on the ways and in the course of building, and 2 battleships launched.

The total number of new capital ships thus to be scrapped is 15. The total tonnage of the new capital ships when completed would be 618,000 tons.

(2) To scrap all of the older battleships up to, but not including, the *Delaware* and *North Dakota*. The number of these old battleships to be scrapped is 15. The total tonnage is 227,740 tons.

Thus the number of capital ships to be scrapped by the United States, if this plan is accepted, is 30, with an aggregate tonnage (including that of ships in construction, if completed) of 845,740 tons.

#### *Great Britain*—

The plan contemplates that Great Britain and Japan shall take action which is fairly commensurate with this action on the part of the United States.

It is proposed that Great Britain—

(1) Shall stop further construction of the 4 new *Hoods*, the new capital ships not laid down, but upon which money has been spent. The 4 ships, if completed, would have a tonnage displacement of 172,000 tons.

(2) Shall, in addition, scrap her predreadnaughts, second line battleships, and first line battleships, up to, but not including, the *King George V* class.

These, with certain predreadnaughts, which it is understood have already been scrapped, would amount to 19 capital ships and a tonnage reduction of 411,375 tons.

The total tonnage of ships thus to be scrapped by Great Britain (including the tonnage of the 4 *Hoods*, if completed) would be 583,375 tons.

#### *Japan*—

It is proposed that Japan—

(1) Shall abandon her program of ships not yet laid down,

viz., the *Kii*, *Owari*, No. 7 and No. 8 battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8 battle cruisers.

It should be observed that this does not involve the stopping of construction, as the construction of none of these ships has been begun.

(2) Shall scrap 3 capital ships (the *Mutsu* launched, the *Tosa*, and *Kago* in course of building) and 4 battle cruisers (the *Amagi* and *Akagi* in course of building, and the *Atago* and *Takao*, not yet laid down, but for which certain material has been assembled).

The total number of new capital ships to be scrapped under this paragraph is 7. The total tonnage of these new capital ships, when completed, would be 289,100 tons.

(3) Shall scrap all predreadnaughts and battleships of the second line. This would include the scrapping of all ships up to but not including the *Settsu*; that is, the scrapping of 10 older ships, with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons.

The total reduction of tonnage on vessels existing, laid down, or for which material has been assembled (taking the tonnage of the new ships when completed) would be 448,928 tons.

Thus, under this plan there would be immediately destroyed, of the navies of the three Powers, 66 capital fighting ships built and building, but a total tonnage of 1,878,043.

It is proposed that it should be agreed by the United States, Great Britain and Japan that their navies, with respect to capital ships, within three months after the making of the agreement, shall consist of certain ships designated in the proposal and numbering for the United States 18, for Great Britain 22, for Japan 10.

The tonnage of these ships would be as follows: Of the United States, 500,650; of Great Britain, 604,450; of Japan, 299,700. In reaching this result, the age factor in the case of the respective navies has reached appropriate consideration.

#### Replacement—

With respect to replacement, the United States proposes:

- (1) That it be agreed that the first replacement tonnage shall not be laid down until 10 years from the date of the agreement;
- (2) That replacement be limited by an agreed maximum of capital ship tonnage as follows:

For the United States.....	500,000 tons
For Great Britain.....	500,000 tons
For Japan.....	300,000 tons

(3) That subject to the 10-year limitation above fixed and the maximum standard, capital ships may be replaced when they are 20 years old by new capital ship construction;

(4) That no capital ship shall be built in replacement with a tonnage displacement of more than 35,000 tons.

I have sketched the proposal only in outline, leaving the technical details to be supplied by the formal proposition which is ready for submission to the delegates.

The plan includes provision for the limitation of auxiliary combatant craft. This term embraces three classes, that is (1) auxiliary surface combatant craft, such as cruisers (exclusive of battle cruisers), flotilla leaders, destroyers, and various surface types; (2) submarines, and (3) airplane carriers.

I shall not attempt to review the proposals for these various classes, as they bear a definite relation to the provisions for capital fighting ships.

With the acceptance of this plan the burden of meeting the demands of competition in naval armament will be lifted. Enormous sums will be released to aid the progress of civilization. At the same time the proper demands of national defense will be adequately met and the nations will have ample opportunity during the naval holiday of 10 years to consider their future course. Preparation for future naval war will stop now.

I shall not attempt at this time to take up the other topics which have been listed on the tentative agenda proposed in anticipation of the Conference.

## 2. PROPOSAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR A LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT

The United States proposes the following plan for a limitation of the naval armament of the conferring nations. The United States believes that this plan safely guards the interests of all concerned.

In working out this proposal the United States has been guided by four general principles:

(a) The elimination of all capital ship building programs, either actual or projected.

- (b) Further reduction through the scrapping of certain of the older ships.
- (c) That regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the conferring powers.
- (d) The use of capital ship tonnage as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.

**PROPOSAL**  
**“For a limitation of naval armament”**

**CAPITAL SHIPS**

**UNITED STATES**

- 1. The United States to scrap all new capital ships now under construction and on their way to completion. This includes 6 battle cruisers and 7 battleships on the ways and building and 2 battleships launched.

NOTE—(Paragraph 1 involves a reduction of 15 new capital ships under construction, with a total tonnage when completed of 618,000 tons. Total amount of money already spent on 15 capital ships, \$382,000,000.)

- 2. The United States to scrap all battleships up to, but not including, the *Delaware* and *North Dakota*.

NOTE—(The number of old battleships scrapped under paragraph 2 is 15; their total tonnage is 227,740 tons. The grand total of capital ships to be scrapped is 30, aggregating 845,740 tons.)

**GREAT BRITAIN**

- 3. Great Britain to stop further construction of the 4 new *Hoods*.

NOTE—(Paragraph 3 involves a reduction of 4 new capital ships not yet laid down, but upon which money has been spent, with a total tonnage when completed of 172,000 tons.)

- 4. In addition to the 4 *Hoods*, Great Britain to scrap her predreadnaughts, second-line battleships and first-line battleships up to, but not including, the *King George V.* class.

NOTE—(Paragraph 4 involves the disposition of 19 capital ships (certain of which have already been scrapped) with a tonnage reduction of 411,375 tons. The grand total tonnage of ships scrapped under this agreement will be 583,375 tons.)

**JAPAN**

- 5. Japan to abandon her program of ships not yet laid down, viz.: the *Kii*, *Owari*, No. 7, No. 8, battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8, battle cruisers.

NOTE—(Paragraph 5 does not involve the stopping of construction on any ship upon which construction has begun.)

6. Japan to scrap 3 battleships: the *Mutsu*, launched; the *Tosa* and *Kaga*, building; and 4 battle cruisers: the *Amagi* and *Akagi*, building, and the *Atago* and *Takao* not yet laid down, but for which certain material has been assembled.

NOTE—(Paragraph 6 involves a reduction of 7 new capital ships under construction, with a total tonnage when completed of 288,100 tons.)

7. Japan to scrap all predreadnaughts and capital ships of the second line. This to include scrapping of all ships up to, but not including, the *Settsu*.

NOTE—(Paragraph 7 involves the scrapping of 10 older ships with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons. The grand total reduction of tonnage on vessels existing, laid down, or for which material has been assembled, is 448,928 tons.)

#### FRANCE AND ITALY

8. In view of certain extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting the existing strengths of the navies of France and Italy, the United States does not consider necessary the discussion at this stage of the proceedings of the tonnage allowance of these nations, but proposes it be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference.

#### OTHER NEW CONSTRUCTION

9. No other new capital ships shall be constructed during the period of this agreement except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter.

10. If the terms of this proposal are agreed to, then the United States, Great Britain and Japan agree that their navies, three months after the making of this agreement, shall consist of the following capital ships:

*List of Capital Ships*

UNITED STATES	GREAT BRITAIN	JAPAN
Maryland	Royal Sovereign	Nagato
California	Royal Oak	Hiuga
Tennessee	Resolution	Ise
Idaho	Ramillies	Yamashiro
Mississippi	Revenge	Fu-So
New Mexico	Queen Elizabeth	Settsu
Arizona	Warspite	Kirishima
Pennsylvania	Valiant	Haruna
Oklahoma	Barham	Hi-Yei
Nevada	Malaya	Kongo
Texas	Benbow	Total, 10
New York	Emperor of India	Total tonnage, 299,700
Arkansas	Iron Duke	
Wyoming	Marlborough	
Utah	Erin	
Florida	King George V	
North Dakota	Centurion	
Delaware	Ajax	
Total, 18	Hood	
Total tonnage, 500,650	Renown	
	Repulse	
	Tiger	
	Total, 22	
	Total tonnage, 604,450	

18.

22

10

*Disposition of Old and New Construction*

11. Capital ships shall be disposed of in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

*Replacements*

12. (a) The tonnage basis for capital ship replacement under this proposal to be as follows:

United States.....	500,000 tons
Great Britain.....	500,000 tons
Japan .....	300,000 tons

(b) Capital ships 20 years from date of completion may be replaced by new capital ship construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is 17 years of age from date of completion. Provided, however, that the first replacement tonnage shall not be laid down until 10 years from the date of the signing of this agreement.

(c) The scrapping of capital ships replaced by new construction shall be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construction and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion of new construction; or if the date of completion of new construction be delayed, then within four years of the laying of the keels of such new construction.

(d) No capital ships shall be laid down during the term of this agreement, whose tonnage displacement exceeds 35,000 tons.

(e) The same rules for determining tonnage of capital ships shall apply to the ships of each of the Powers party to this agreement.

(f) Each of the Powers party to this agreement agrees to inform promptly all of the other Powers party to this agreement concerning:

- (1) The names of the capital ships to be replaced by new construction;
- (2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage;
- (3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;
- (4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down;
- (5) The actual date of completion of each new ship;
- (6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

(g) No fabricated parts of capital ships, including parts of hulls, engines and ordnance, shall be constructed previous to the date of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be furnished all Powers party to this agreement.

(h) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of capital ships, they may be replaced by new capital ship construction in conformity with the foregoing rules.

**AUXILIARY COMBATANT CRAFT**

13. In treating this subject, auxiliary combatant craft have been divided into three classes:

- (a) Auxiliary surface combatant craft.
- (b) Submarines.
- (c) Airplane carriers and aircraft.

**(a) AUXILIARY SURFACE COMBATANT CRAFT**

14. The term auxiliary surface combatant craft includes cruisers (exclusive of battle cruisers), flotilla leaders, destroyers and all other surface types except those specifically exempted in the following paragraph.

15. Existing monitors, unarmored surface craft as specified in paragraph 16, under 3,000 tons; fuel ships, supply ships, tenders, repair ships, tugs, mine sweepers and vessels readily convertible from merchant vessels are exempt from the terms of this agreement.

16. No new auxiliary combatant craft may be built exempt from this agreement regarding limitation of naval armament that exceed 3,000 tons displacement and 15 knots speed and carry more than four 5-inch guns.

17. It is proposed that the total tonnage of cruisers, flotilla leaders and destroyers allowed each Power shall be as follows:

For the United States.....	450,000 tons
For Great Britain.....	450,000 tons
For Japan.....	270,000 tons

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in auxiliary surface combatant craft on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

***Limitation of New Construction***

18. (a) All auxiliary surface combatant craft whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new construction in auxiliary surface combatant craft except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter shall be laid down during the period of this agreement; provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the auxiliary surface combatant craft tonnage allowances hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

*Scrappling of Old Construction*

19. Auxiliary surface combatant craft shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

## (B) SUBMARINES

20. It is proposed that the total tonnage of submarines allowed each Power shall be as follows:

For the United States.....	90,000 tons
For Great Britain.....	90,000 tons
For Japan.....	54,000 tons

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in submarines on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin at which time the total tonnage of submarines for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

*Limitation of New Construction*

21. (a) All submarines whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new submarine tonnage except replacement tonnage as provided hereinafter shall be laid down during the period of this agreement; provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the submarine tonnage allowance hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

*Scrappling of Old Construction*

22. Submarines shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

## (C) AIRPLANE CARRIERS AND AIRCRAFT

23. It is proposed that the total tonnage of airplane carriers allowed each Power shall be as follows:

United States.....	80,000 tons
Great Britain.....	80,000 tons
Japan.....	48,000 tons

Provided, however, that no Power party to this agreement whose total tonnage in airplane carriers on November 11, 1921, exceeds the prescribed tonnage shall be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements begin, at which time the total tonnage of airplane carriers for each nation shall be reduced to the prescribed allowance as herein stated.

*Limitation of New Construction*

## AIRPLANE CARRIERS

24. (a) All airplane carriers whose keels have been laid down by November 11, 1921, may be carried to completion.

(b) No new airplane carrier tonnage except replacement tonnage as provided herein shall be laid down during the period of this agreement; provided, however, that such nations as have not reached the airplane carrier tonnage hereinbefore stated may construct tonnage up to the limit of their allowance.

*Scraping of Old Construction*

25. Airplane carriers shall be scrapped in accordance with methods to be agreed upon.

## AUXILIARY COMBATANT CRAFT

## REPLACEMENTS

26. (a) Cruisers 17 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new construction. The keels for such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is 15 years of age from date of completion.

(b) Destroyers and flotilla leaders 12 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new construction. The keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage it is intended to replace is 11 years of age from date of completion.

(c) Submarines 12 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new submarine construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which the new tonnage is to replace is 11 years of age from date of completion.

(d) Airplane carriers 20 years of age from date of completion may be replaced by new airplane carrier construction, but the keels of such new construction shall not be laid until the tonnage which it is to replace is 17 years of age from date of completion.

(e) No surface vessel carrying guns of caliber greater than 8 inches shall be laid down as replacement tonnage for military combatant surface craft.

(f) The same rules for determining tonnage of auxiliary combatant craft shall apply to the ships of each of the Powers party to this agreement.

(g) The scrapping of ships replaced by new construction shall be undertaken not later than the date of completion of the new construction and shall be completed within three months of the date of completion of the new construction, or, if the completion of new tonnage is delayed, then within 4 years of the laying of the keels of such new construction.

(h) Each of the Powers party to this agreement agrees to inform all of the other Powers party to this agreement concerning:

(1) The names or numbers of the ships to be replaced by new construction;

(2) The date of authorization of replacement tonnage;

(3) The dates of laying the keels of replacement tonnage;

(4) The displacement tonnage of each new ship to be laid down;

(5) The actual date of completion of each new ship;

(6) The fact and date of the scrapping of ships replaced.

(i) No fabricated parts of auxiliary combatant craft, including parts of hulls, engines, and ordnance, will be constructed previous to the date of authorization of replacement tonnage. A list of such parts will be furnished all Powers party to this agreement.

(j) In case of the loss or accidental destruction of ships of this class they may be replaced by new construction in conformity with the foregoing rules.

#### AIRCRAFT

27. The limitation of naval aircraft is not proposed.

NOTE—(Owing to the fact that naval aircraft may be readily adapted from special types of commercial aircraft, it is not considered practicable to prescribe limits for naval aircraft.)

#### GENERAL RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER OF COMBATANT VESSELS OF ALL CLASSES

28. The Powers party to this agreement bind themselves not to dispose of combatant vessels of any class in such a manner that they later may become combatant vessels in another navy. They bind themselves further not to acquire combatant vessels from any foreign source.

29. No capital ship tonnage nor auxiliary combatant craft tonnage for foreign account shall be constructed within the jurisdiction of any one of the Powers party to this agreement during the term of this agreement.

#### MERCHANT MARINE

30. As the importance of the merchant marine is in inverse ratio to the size of naval armaments, regulations must be provided to govern its conversion features for war purposes.

#### 3. AGREEMENT REACHED BY SUBCOMMITTEE ON NAVAL ARMAMENT, DECEMBER 15, 1921

The agreement was made public in the following announcement of the Subcommittee on Naval Armament, which was sent out by the Associated Press:

The following are the points of agreement that have been reached in the course of the negotiations between the United States of America, Great Britain and Japan with respect to their capital fighting ships.

An agreement has been reached between the three powers—the United States of America, the British Empire, and Japan—on the subject of naval ratio. The proposal of the American Government that the ratio should be 5-5-3 is accepted.

It is agreed that with respect to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific region, including Hong Kong, the status quo shall be maintained, that is, that there shall be no increase in these fortifications and naval bases except that this restriction shall not apply to the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, New Zealand and the islands composing Japan proper, or, of course, to the coasts of the United States and Canada, as to which the respective Powers retain their entire freedom.

The Japanese Government has found special difficulty with respect to the *Mutsu* as that is their newest ship. In order to retain the *Mutsu* Japan has proposed to scrap the *Settsu*, one of her older ships, which, under the American proposal, was to have been retained. This would leave the number of Japan's capital ships the same, that is, 10, as under the American proposal. The retention of the *Mutsu* by Japan in place of the *Settsu* makes a difference in net tonnage of 13,600 tons, making the total tonnage of Japan's capital ships 313,300 tons, as against 299,700 tons under the original American proposal.

While the difference in tonnage is small, there would be considerable difference in efficiency, as the retention of the *Mutsu* would give to Japan two post-Jutland ships of the latest design.

In order to meet this situation and to preserve the relative strength on the basis of the agreed ratio, it is agreed that the United States shall complete two of the ships in course of construction, that is, the *Colorado* and the *Washington*, which are now about 90 per cent completed, and scrap two of the older ships, that is, the *North Dakota* and the *Delaware*, which under the original proposal were to be retained. This would leave the United States with the same number of capital ships, that is, 18 as under the original proposal, with a tonnage of 525,850 tons, as

against 500,650 tons as originally proposed. Three of the ships would be post-Jutland ships of the *Maryland* type.

As the British have no post-Jutland ships, except one *Hood*, the construction of which is only partly post-Jutland, it is agreed that in order to maintain proper relative strength the British Government may construct two new ships, not to exceed 35,000 legend tons each, that is, calculating the tonnage according to British standards of measurement, or according to American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons each.

It is agreed that the British Government shall, on the completion of these two new ships, scrap four of their ships of the *King George V* type, that is, the *Erin*, *King George V*, *Centurion* and *Ajax*, which were to have been retained under the original American proposal. This would leave the British capital ships in number 20, as against 22 under the American proposal.

Taking the tonnage of the two new ships according to American calculation, it would amount to 74,000 and the 4 ships scrapped having a tonnage of 96,400 tons, leaving the British tonnage of capital ships 582,050, instead of 604,450. This would give the British as against the United States an excess tonnage of 66,200 tons, which is deemed to be fair, in view of the age of the ships of the *Royal Sovereign* and the *Queen Elizabeth* types.

The maximum limitation for the tonnage of ships to be constructed in replacement is to be fixed at 35,000 legend tons, that is, according to British standards of measurement, or according to American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons.

In order to give accommodations to these changes, the maximum tonnage of capital ships is fixed, for the purpose of replacement, on the basis of American standards of calculation, as follows:

United States, 525,000 tons;

Great Britain, 525,000 tons;

Japan, 315,000 tons.

Comparing this arrangement with the original American proposal, it will be observed that the United States is to scrap 30 ships, as proposed, save that there will be scrapped 13 of the 15 ships under construction, and 17 instead of 15 of the older ships.

The total tonnage of the American capital ships to be scrapped under the original proposal, including the tonnage of ships in

construction, if completed, was stated to be 845,740 tons. Under the present arrangement, the tonnage of the 30 ships to be scrapped, taking that of the ships in construction if completed, would be 820,540 tons.

The number of the Japanese ships to be retained remains the same as under the original proposal. The total tonnage of the ships to be scrapped by Japan under the original American proposal, taking the tonnage of new ships when completed, was stated to be 448,923 tons. The total tonnage of the ships to be scrapped under the present arrangement is 435,328 tons.

Under the original proposal Great Britain was to scrap 19 capital ships (including certain predreadnaughts already scrapped); whereas under the present arrangement she will scrap four more, or a total of 23. The total tonnage of ships to be scrapped by Great Britain, including the tonnage of the four *Hoods*, to which the proposal referred as laid down, if completed, was stated to be 583,375 tons. The corresponding total of scrapped ships under the new arrangement will be 22,600 tons more, or 605,975 tons.


Under the American proposal there were to be scrapped 66 capital fighting ships built and building, with a total tonnage (taking ships laid down as completed) of 1,878,043 tons. Under the present arrangement, on the same basis of calculation, there are to be scrapped 68 capital fighting ships, with a tonnage of 1,861,643 tons.

The naval holiday of 10 years with respect to capital ships, as originally proposed by the American Government, is to be maintained except for the permission to construct ships as above stated.

This arrangement between the United States, Great Britain and Japan is, so far as the number of ships to be retained and scrapped is concerned, dependent upon a suitable agreement with France and Italy as to their capital ships, a matter which is now in course of negotiation.

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